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Emerging From the Confusion:
Zoning and Vested Rights in
Pennsylvania
I. Introduction
Throughout the history of municipal zoning regulation,' a ten-
sion has always existed between constitutionally protected property
rights2 and municipal zoning regulation. This tension is recurringly
manifested when courts attempt to determine whether a landowner
has acquired a vested right to continue to use his property in a man-
ner that is subsequently prohibited by a zoning ordinance.3 Penn-
sylvania courts have been wrestling with the question for forty-nine
years.4 In determining whether a building permit or an application
for a building permit confers a vested right on a landowner to pro-
ceed with construction in the face of a zoning change, Pennsylvania
courts analyze the situation in a way that is unique among the fifty
states. The vested rights rules in Pennsylvania, however, are not
completely clear because they have been drawn from cases in which
the early vested rights rules were inconsistently applied. These rules
began with the formulation of a general rule, which was refined and
which is now virtually ignored, and continued with the creation and
growth of the pending ordinance rule.
Other situations such as the finding of a vested right in an erro-
neously issued or invalid permit and the argument that municipal
inactivity or failure to enforce its applicable ordinances creates a
vested right have developed a more restrictive and more consistent
set of rules. The legislature has also developed a statutory vested
1. See Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904) (pre-zoning case dealing with
vested rights in the face of a regulatory ordinance).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
3. The concept of a nonconforming use, a use of the land or structure that predates the
enactment of a zoning ordinance or amendment, confers on the owner a vested right to con-
tinue to use his property or retain his structure despite its violation of the ordinance. Noncon-
forming uses are beyond the scope of this comment, which will examine vested rights created
or alleged to have been created in other ways.
4. The first Pennsylvania decision to discuss vested rights is Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa.
155, 149 A. 195 (1930).
5. Only Washington and South Carolina are close to viewing vested rights in the same
manner as Pennsylvania. Illinois analyzes some cases along the same lines as the Pennsylvania
courts. See notes 56-78 and accompanying text infra.
rights rule in the case of an approved subdivision plan.6
Nevertheless, further refinement of the pending ordinance rule
is necessary to ascertain when validly issued permits cause land use
rights to vest. If a more refined rule is expounded and consistently
applied, the amount of vested rights litigation will be cut substan-
tially, and Pennsylvania's rule will then serve as a model for other
states to emulate.
II. Vested Rights in a Valid Permit or Application for a Permit
A. The Original Rule
Although arising earlier in other jurisdictions,7 the issue of
vested rights accruing to a validly issued permit' was not presented
in the Pennsylvania courts until 1930 in Herskovits v. Irwin.9 In Her-
skovits plaintiff applied for and received a grading permit. He then
proceeded to incur expenses in grading and building the foundation
for a six-story apartment building. When the foundation was com-
pleted, the building inspector refused to issue a building permit to
complete construction of the building on the ground that the town-
ship was considering an amendment to its zoning ordinance' ° limit-
ing buildings in that district to three stories. The supreme court held
that the issuance of the grading permit and plaintiffs reliance upon
it had conferred a vested right on him to complete the construction
and ordered issuance of the building permit.I
Thus, Pennsylvania's first formulation of a vested rights rule re-
6. The legislature contributed to a consistent approach in 1968 by enacting the Penn-
sylvania Municipalities Planning Code, 1968, P.L. 805, article V, § 508(4); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
53, § 10508(4) (Purdon 1972).
7. See, e.g., Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904); Pelham Bay Apartments v.
Switzer, 130 Misc. 545, 224 N.Y.S. 56 (1927). Seegenerally Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
394 (1915); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
8. The most common type of permit in which a vested right is alleged to have been
created is a building permit, but other types of permits, such as zoning permits, grading per-
mits, and septic tank permits, have been involved in the cases. See, e.g., Herskovits v. Irwin,
299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930) (grading permit); Department of Envt'l Resources v. Flynn, 21
Pa. Commw. Ct. 264, 344 A.2d 720 (1975) (septic tank permit).
9. 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930).
10. Normally the procedure for adopting a zoning ordinance begins with the municipal-
ity planning commission. The commission undertakes studies to determine the most feasible
zoning scheme and drafts an ordinance or amendment based on these studies or plans. It then
advertises the proposals and holds a public hearing or hearings on them, makes needed
changes, and may hold more hearings during the process. Eventually the commission recom-
mends an ordinance to the municipal governing body for its action. Before enacting the ordi-
nance the governing body may also hold a public hearing or hearings and may make further
changes to the proposal.
The Board of Adjustment or Zoning Hearing Board is a judicial body that has nothing to
do with this process. The Board issues rulings and hears appeals from the officer designated to
enforce the provisions of the ordinance. It most often enters the process upon an appeal by a
landowner if the building officer or zoning officer refuses to issue a permit or revokes a permit.
11. When a jpermit was issued for the foundations of a "six-story apartment" build-
ing, the applicants, under circumstances such as those attending issuance of the per-
mit now in question, had the right to assume that, if their finished plans showed
compliance with existing building and zoning regulations, a final permit would natu-
quired the permittee to show substantial reliance on a validly issued
permit for the vested right to accrue. 2 Although not specifically dis-
cussed in Herskovits, later cases made it clear that the permittee had
to demonstrate good faith'3 as well as substantial reliance.' 4 A
number of cases decided under this original rule held that a permit
was absolutely necessary, and expenses that were not incurred pursu-
ant to a validly issued permit did not create a vested right."5 Under
this reasoning a mere application did not usually create a vested
right in the applicant.
B. The Revised Rule
In Gallagher v. Building Inspector, City of Erie,'6 the supreme
court established what is generally considered to be the current
Pennsylvania vested rights rule.' 7 A close examination of the case in
conjunction with the pending ordinance rule,' 8 however, casts much
doubt on the proposition that the case stands for a general rule.' 9 In
Gallagher the court relaxed the original rule by eliminating the need
to show reliance on the permit to create a vested right."u The court
distinguished Herskovits v. Irwin2 and a long line of other cases that
rally follow for the complete structure. Here, appellees proceeded accordingly, and
incurred expense and legal obligations.
299 Pa. at 161, 149 A. at 197.
12. "A permit having been issued and work done thereunder, a right was created in the
applicants as to which they were entitled to protection; the subsequent attempt to revoke the
permit could not abrogate this right." Id at 161, 149 A. at 197.
13. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Township Bd. of Supervisors, 438 Pa. 457, 266 A.2d 84 (1970); Penn
Twp. v. Yecko Bros., 420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966); A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New
Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954).
14. Schechter v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 395 Pa. 310, 149 A.2d 28 (1959) (dist-
inguishing Herskovits on the ground that no substantial expenditures in reliance on the permit
were made by permittee); A.N. "Ab" Young Co. Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948);
ef Price v. Smith, 416 Pa. 560, 207 A.2d 887 (1965) (substantial expenditures not necessary,
temporary structure sufficient to create vested right).
15. City of Harrisburg v. Pass, 372 Pa. 318, 93 A.2d 447 (1953); Appeal of Mutual Supply
Co., 366 Pa. 424, 77 A.2d 612 (1951); Berger v. Borough of Bethel Park, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 13,
321 A.2d 389 (1974); Hunter v. Richter, 9 Pa. D. & C.2d 58 (C.P. Montg. 1955).
16. 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968), noted at 73 DICK. L. REV. 578.
17. See, e.g., I R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 6.24 (2d ed. 1976); Heeter,
Zoning Estoppel" Application ofthe Prinples ofEquitable Estoppel to Zoning Disputes, 1971
URB. L. ANN. 63, 85.
18. See notes 33-53 and accompanying text infra.
19. The supreme court decided Gulf Oil Corp. v. Township Bd. of Supervisors, 438 Pa.
457, 266 A.2d 84 (1970), two years later without mentioning Gallagher. In Colonial Park for
Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 594, 290 A.2d 719 (1972), the
commonwealth court indicated that Gallagher was an exception to the. general rule.
20. A building permit for the construction of town houses was issued to plaintiff on De-
cember 12, 1966. At that time town houses were permitted in the B residential zone. Follow-
ing neighborhood protests in January 1967, the city solicitor notified plaintiffs that their
building permits would be suspended, and that the city was considering amending the zoning
ordinance to prohibit town houses on plaintiffs' property. On March 9, 1967, the city rezoned
the area to an A residential area where town houses were prohibited, and on March 17, 1967,
plaintiffs' building permit was revoked. Plaintiffs had spent no money and incurred no liabili-
ties in reliance upon the permit. Yet the supreme court held that plaintiffs had acquired a
vested right and ordered issuance of the permit.
21. 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930).
cite the rule of Herskovits22 because in those cases a zoning ordi-
nance was pending at the time when application for a building per-
mit was made. In Gallagher, the amendment to the zoning
ordinance was not introduced, passed, and adopted by the city coun-
cil until after the permit had been issued, and although the permittee
had not made any significant expenditures in reliance upon the per-
mit before the amendment was adopted, the court found that he had
acquired a vested right. In the Gallagher court's opinion, however,
are references to municipal bad faith,23 which a previous line of
cases had held to be significant in finding a vested right in the per-
mittee.24
The danger in using the purported rule of Gallagher literally is
pointed out by Justice Cohen:
The problem of how long the holder [of the permit] can re-
main inactive with what amounts to an "outstanding lien" and
thereby defeat a justifiable change in a zoning ordinance is neither
decided nor discussed. It should be made clear that the majority
opinion is not precedent for any position and cannot be used as
such when that problem comes before us.
25
The commonwealth court has given Gallagher little precedential
value,26 but has not directly addressed the problem discussed by Jus-
tice Cohen,27 except in its development of the pending ordinance
rule.28 The Gallagher rule does offer a significant advantage over the
original rule stated in Hersko vis 29 because the date on which a right
created in a permit vests is more certain, but it does not delimit the
22. Honey Brook Twp. v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614, 243 A.2d 330 (1968); Penn Twp. v.
Fratto, 430 Pa. 487, 244 A.2d 39 (1968); Penn Twp. v. Yecko Bros., 420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171
(1966); A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954); A.N.
"Ab" Young Co. Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948); Gold v. Building Committee,
334 Pa. 10, 5 A.2d 367 (1939).
23. "Landowners received their building permits in entire good faith, before any action
toward a zoning change. After the grant of the permits, the City decided to amend the ordi-
nance, to prevent the appellees from completing that which was perfectly legal when they
began it." Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 304, 247 A.2d 572, 573 (1968).
24. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text infra on municipal bad faith. Although mu-
nicipal bad faith was not a factor in the Herskovits rule, a number of cases developing that rule
had intimated that the good faith of the municipality would be implied before the rule could
operate.
25. 432 Pa. at 307, 247 A.2d at 575 (Cohen, J., concurring).
26. Gallagher has been cited only seven times in the ten years since it had been decided.
It was distinguished in two of those cases: Calabrese v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 5 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 444, 291 A.2d 326 (1972) (rezoning before issuance of permit, no goodfaith reli-
ance on permit); Colonial Park for Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 5 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 594, 290 A.2d 719 (1972) (Gallagher called exception to rule). In the other cases, only
passing reference was made to Gallagher; none of them relied on it or cited it as stating a
general rule.
27. Only one subsequent case has provided a clue. In North Coventry Twp. v. Silver Fox
Corp., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 646, 312 A.2d 833 (1973) the commonwealth court held that a
fifteen-month period with little evidence of work done under authority of the permit does not
prevent the permit from then being revoked by the municipality in the face of a newly enacted
zoning ordinance.
28. See notes 33-53 and accompanying text infra.
29. Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930). See notes 7-15 and accompany-
ing text supra.
length of time during which the permit must actually be used. 30
Thus, a landowner or developer could acquire permits for then per-
mitted uses on hearing of the possibility of a new zoning ordinance
or amendment, and without further action, establish a nonconform-
ing use.3" He might then hold the permit indefinitely while deter-
mining what effect the new zoning will have on his land. This
practice would frustrate the very reason for the enactment of a zon-
ing ordinance.3 2
C. The Pending Ordinance Rule
The major reason for the commonwealth court's disregard of
the Gallagher rule33 is the contemporaneous development by the
supreme court of the pending ordinance rule as an aid in determin-
ing when rights vest in a permit. Pennsylvania is the only state to
use this rule.34
In its initial form the pending ordinance rule was quite simple:
a person could not acquire a vested right in a building permit for a
use permitted in the area if there was a pending zoning ordinance or
amendment to an existing zoning ordinance that would prohibit the
use from being established in that location.35 The rule was intended
to prevent the landowner from developing a use that immediately
would become nonconforming.3 6 Since the rule necessarily created
30. Only two other states, Washington and South Carolina, use a rule similar to this one.
In the leading Washington case, Hull v. Hunt, 53 Wash. 2d 125, 331 P.2d 856 (1958), the
supreme court ruled that a vested right existed on the date of an application for a permit for a
permitted use or structure if the permit was actually issued. The court conceded that this was a
minority position but preferred to find a date certain when the right vested. Unfortunately, the
rule has not been consistently applied in Washington. See, e.g., Pierce v. King County, 62
Wash. 2d 324, 382 P.2d 628 (1963) (no permit issued; vested right still found in application);
Parkridge v. City of Seattle, 89 Wash. 2d 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978) (no permit issued; vested
right in application, elements of municipal bad faith and delay involved); cf. Talbot v. Gray,
11 Wash. App. 807, 525 P.2d 801 (1974) (state legislation permitted use in coastal zone during
time between application and permit, right then vested in application). The South Carolina
rule is based on only two cases and may not yet be fully developed.
31. See note 3 supra and note 36 infra.
32. A zoning ordinance is an exercise of the police power to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare. A determination of the governing body that a given use in a given location
will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare should not be frustrated as easily as
this construction would permit.
33. See note 26 supra.
34. See R. ANDERSON, supra note 17; Heeter, supra note 17, at 89. See also Annot., 50
A.L.R. 3d 596 (1973); Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 13 (1973). Idaho may have applied a version of this
rule in Ben Lomond, Inc. v. Idaho Falls, 92 Idaho 595, 448 P.2d 209 (1968). The Washington
and South Carolina rules, discussed in note 30 supra, are similar but more like the Gallagher
rule.
35. Beverly Bldg. Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, 409 Pa. 417, 187 A.2d 567 (1963); Colligan
Zoning Case, 401 Pa. 125, 162 A.2d 652 (1960); A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington,
377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954); City of Harrisburg v. Pass, 372 Pa. 318, 93 A.2d 447 (1953);
A.N. "Ab" Young Co. Zoning Case, 360 Pa. 429, 61 A.2d 839 (1948); Gold v. Building Comm.,
334 Pa. 10, 5 A.2d 367 (1939); Gheen v. Mencer, 52 Pa. D. & C. 422 (C.P. Lyc. 1945); Huetsch
v. Grove, 16 Pa. D. & C. 86, 23 Berks 154 (C.P. 1930) (not involving zoning ordinance).
36. "A 'nonconforming use' is the use of a building or land that does not agree with the
regulations of the use district in which it is situated." In re Yocum, 393 Pa. 148, 153; 141 A.2d
the problem of determining when an ordinance was pending, it was
not always applied in cases in which it could have been or should
have been.37
Beginning in the 1960's the rule was refined. First, the supreme
court held 38 that the mere preparation of an ordinance and referral
of it to the planning commission 39 was not sufficient to make an or-
dinance pending.4° This rule still did not offer much guidance on
when an ordinance was pending. Then, seven years later, the court
clarified the rule in Gallagher4  that an ordinance was pending when
it was before the municipal governing body and had been properly
advertised.42 The next year the court expanded the time during
which an ordinance would be considered pending4 3 and concluded
that it was pending when it was before the zoning commission for a
hearing and had been properly advertised.' This holding was more
favorable to the municipality because a zoning ordinance or amend-
ment is normally considered by the planning commission or zoning
commission before being considered by the municipal governing
body.45
Finally, the present rule, which was derived from the foregoing
601, 605 (1958). "[A] non-conforming use is one which does not comply with present zoning
provisions but which existed lawfully and was created in good faith prior to the enactment of
the zoning provision." Camaron Apartments, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 14 Pa.
Commw. Ct. 571, 574, 324 A.2d 805, 807 (1974). Nonconforming uses are otherwise beyond
the scope of this comment. See, e.g., Cable and Hauck, The Property Owner's Non-Conforming
Uses and VestedRights, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 404 (1974) (deals primarily with Oregon law, but
general rules explained).
37. A striking example of this is the parallel, but inconsistent cases of Shender v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 388 Pa. 265, 131 A.2d 90 (1957) and Lened Homes, Inc. v. Department of
Licenses and Inspections, 386 Pa. 50, 123 A.2d 406 (1956). The cases were based on substan-
tially identical facts, but were different procedurally and reached opposite results. Had the
Pending Ordinance Rule been applied, the results in the two cases would have been consistent.
See Craig, Zoning Law, 19 U. Pirr. L. REv. 242 (1958) (attempt to reconcile these cases).
38. Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963).
39. In Lhormer no public hearings on the proposed amendment to the zoning ordinance
were held by the borough planning commission or borough council prior to the date of appli-
cation for the permit, nor was there any prior public declaration by the municipality that it
intended to rezone the area. The borough solicitor had merely prepared an amended ordi-
nance about one year earlier and referred it to the planning commission for study.
40. Accord, Verratti v. Ridley Twp., 416 Pa. 242, 206 A.2d 13 (1965).
41. Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968). The exceedingly
vague nature of the pending ordinance rule in 1968 surely influenced the Gallagher decision,
and the subsequent refinement of the rule has been the factor that has relegated Gallagher to
the position of an anachronism-a purported rule that is not followed, and that has even been
called the exception.
42. Mutzig v. Board of Adjustment, 440 Pa. 455, 269 A.2d 694 (1970).
43. Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 284 A.2d 744 (1971).
44. The rules for enacting a zoning ordinance are found in § 608 of the Pennsylvania
Municipalities Planning Code, 1968, P.L. 805, art. VI, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10608 (Purdon
1972) and for enacting a zoning ordinance amendment in § 609 of the code and PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 53, § 10609 (Purdon 1972).
45. See note 10 supra. The landowner normally receives less notice under this rule.
Under the prior view that the ordinance is not pending until it has come before the municipal
governing body, the landowner had notice when the ordinance or amendment was being con-
sidered by the planning commission. Thus, property owners could frustrate the purpose of an
ordinance or amendment merely by applying for a permit for a then permitted use during the
progression, was formally enunciated in Casey v. Zoning Hearing
Board of Warwick Townshp.46 The test is as follows: "An ordi-
nance is pending when the governing body has resolved to consider a
particular scheme of rezoning and has advertised to the public its
intention to hold public hearings on the rezoning."" An additional
requirement is that the municipality "[must act] initially in good
faith to achieve permissible ends and thereafter [proceed] with rea-
sonable dispatch in considering the proposed rezoning."48
The rule as stated is simple and easy to apply. If a landowner
applies for a building permit for a permitted use before a proposed
zoning ordinance or amendment has been advertised to the public
for hearings by the planning commission or zoning commission, the
permit must be issued and any rights vest as of that date. A problem
still exists, however, because no court has ruled whether substantial
reliance by the permittee prior to the advertisement of the ordinance
or amendment must be shown before the right will vest49 or whether
the municipality may revoke the permit following advertisement if
this showing is not made:5 0 If it is decided that the landowner must
make some effort to begin the work for which the permit was issued
to create the vested right dating back to its issuance, or if the permit
has a time limit for its use,51 the test will become fair to both the
landowner and to the municipality.52 Such limitations would pre-
vent the outstanding permit from acting as a license for a noncon-
forming use on the property and would allow changes in the zoning
ordinance to take effect as intended.53 To ensure that the rule is eq-
interval between planning commission consideration and formal advertisement by the munici-
pal governing body.
46. 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974). This is one of the very few instances in which the
supreme court has heard a discretionary appeal from the commonwealth court in a zoning
case. The supreme court established the pending ordinance rule in this case and remanded it
to the commonwealth court for further proceedings.
47. Id at 226, 328 A.2d at 467.
48. Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 333, 284 A.2d 744, 748 (1971).
49. This would be more similar to the original rule of Herskovits with a fixed date for
determining when reliance must occur.
50. Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968), would appear not
to permit revocation, though it was decided before the present version of the pending ordi-
nance rule was formulated and also contains language indicating that the municipality acted in
bad faith.
51. See the proposals suggested at notes 102-14 and accompanying text infra.
52. The supreme court used such a balancing test in formulating the rule:
If the pending ordinance doctrine were limited as appellant advocates, only to the
period of time during which the proposed ordinance is formally before the Borough
Council for final action, any one or a number of property owners could gain an
unqualified right to a soon to be prohibited land use by the simple expedient of ap-
plying for a permit between the time the Zoning Commission announces the proposal
and the time the proposal is before the Borough Council for consideration. Though
the question is admittedly not easy, we believe that the Borough's interest in preclud-
ing this eventuality is paramount and of greater concern than any regrettable but
unavoidable harm suffered by an individual landowner.
Boron Oil Co. v. Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 332, 284 A.2d 744, 747 (1971).
53. These limitations would relieve the fears raised by Justice Cohen in his concurring
opinion in Gallagher discussed at notes 25-28 and accompanying text supra.
uitable, the municipality would also have to act within a reasonable
time after initially advertising the ordinance. This would be neces-
sary to prevent municipalities from indefinitely forestalling develop-
ment.
D. Issues Affecting Application of Vested Rights Based on Valid
Permits and Applications
L The Reliance Problem. -The major obstacle facing a court
in deciding whether a right has vested in a permit is determining just
what is54 and what is not"5 substantial reliance upon that permit.
Under Pennsylvania's original rule56 substantial reliance upon the
permit was the key to determining whether a right had vested in a
permit. Under the pending ordinance rule57 it is still unclear
whether reliance upon the permit must be shown before the ordi-
nance is pending. Even though finding the date when a right vests is
made much easier, the problem of determining whether reliance is
necessary is unresolved in Pennsylvania.58
Three separate tests have been used by courts in attempting to
determine reliance: 9 the set quantum test, the balancing test, and
the Pennsylvania test.' The set quantum test is used by a majority
of states and was used in Pennsylvania under the original rule. This
54. The following Pennsylvania cases illustrate findings of substantial reliance on a per-
mit: Lhormer v. Bowen, 410 Pa. 508, 188 A.2d 747 (1963) (loss of opportunity profitably to sell
the property); Appeal of Klein, 395 Pa. 157, 149 A.2d 114 (1959) (contracting to have extensive
work done on structure); Kahn v. Seeds, No. 2, 20 Pa. D. & C. 365 (C.P. Phila. 1934) and Kahn
v. Seeds, No. 1, 20 Pa. D. & C. 361 (C.P. Phila. 1934) (demolition of old structures and con-
tracting for construction of new structures); cf Price v. Smith, 416 Pa. 560, 207 A.2d 887 (1965)
(construction of temporary structure).
55. The following Pennsylvania cases illustrate when substantial reliance on a permit will
not be found: Honey Brook Twp. v. Alenovitz, 430 Pa. 614, 243 A.2d 330 (1968) (expenditure
of $2,000 toward construction cost of $300,000); Schechter v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 395
Pa. 310, 149 A.2d 28 (1959) (examination of premises to determine the amount of material and
number of men to build the structure); Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31, 87 A.2d 299 (1952) (expen-
diture of $27,000 for sewer laterals 20 years earlier); Clover Hill Farms, Inc. v. Board of Super-
visors, 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 239, 289 A.2d 778 (1972) (expenditure of $3,000 on plans five years
earlier); Friendship Bldrs., Inc. v. West Brandywine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., I Pa. Commw.
Ct. 25, 271 A.2d 511 (1970) (earlier subdivision plan); Hunter v. Richter, 9 Pa. D. & C. 2d 58
(C.P. Montg. 1955) (expenditure of $1,200 toward project costing $150,000).
56. See notes 7-15 and accompanying text supra.
57. See notes 33-53 and accompanying text supra.
58. In Pennsylvania the finding of reliance is less important than in other states that still
follow a rule similar to Pennsylvania's original rules because in those states reliance upon the
permit, not the pendency of the ordinance, determines whether a right has vested. Some state
courts attack the problem of reliance by concentrating upon the estoppel aspects of it rather
than upon the vested rights aspect. Although this type of argument may be less complex, in
many jurisdictions it is more difficult to prove estoppel against a municipality than against
another person. See City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr.
23 (1970) (applicability and elements of equitable estoppel against a municipality). See also,
Comment, Application of the Doctrine of Estoppel to Land Use Control and Municipal Taxation,
23 BAYLOR L. REV. 590 (1971); Cuningham & Kremer, Vested Rights, Estoppel, and the Land
Development Process, 29 HASTINrS L.J. 623 (1978). Pennsylvania courts have never used an
estoppel argument outside of the context of municipal inaction.
59. Heeter, supra note 17, at 84-90.
60. Id at84.
test is also used in jurisdictions that base decisions more on an equi-
table estoppel theory than on a vested rights theory.6' An owner is
entitled to relief under this test if he has changed his position beyond
a certain set amount. Unfortunately, the courts have been unable to
determine that amount with any precision.62
The balancing test has been used primarily in Illinois, and also
in close cases elsewhere.63 In this test the courts attempt to weigh the
property owner's right to use his land along with the expenses and
obligation he has incurred against the public interest.64 This test is
even less objective than the set quantum test.
65
Finally, the Pennsylvania test for reliance 66 is the revised rule of
Gallagher.67  Since Gallagher actually eliminated the need to show
reliance,68 however, the Pennsylvania test can hardly be termed a
test for reliance. Moreover, because Pennsylvania courts have
treated Gallagher as an exception and have concentrated on the
61. California seems to be the only state to apply the equitable estoppel doctrine exten-
sively. See, e.g., City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23
(1970); County of San Diego v. California Water & Tel. Co., 30 Cal. 2d 817, 186 P.2d 124
(1947); Raley v. California Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 68 Cal. App. 3d 965, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 699 (1977); People ex rel. Dept. of Pub. Works v. Ryan Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 39
Cal. App. 3d 804, 114 Cal. Rptr. 499 (1974); Pettitt v. City of Fresno, 34 Cal. App. 3d 813, 110
Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973), appeal dismissed, 419 U.S. 810 (1974). See also Cunningham & Kremer,
supra note 58, at 648-60.
62. Heeter, supra note 17, at 85. Most courts have found reliance in initiating construc-
tion of the building, beginning of excavation, pouring the foundation, and installing under-
ground pipes and tanks. Some courts have found entering into financing arrangements to be
substantial reliance, and a few have found mere incurring of contractual obligation without
any construction at all to be sufficient. See also Annot., 89 A.L.R.3d 1051 (1979).
63. Id at 88 n.85.
64. Id at 88 nn.84-87. Cf. Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 58, at 652 (commenting
that discussion of the public interest appears infrequently in the cases).
65. See, e.g., Pioneer Trust and Say. Bank v. County of Cook, 71 111. 2d 510, 377 N.E.2d
21 (1978) and cases cited therein. See also Annot., 50 A.L.R.3d 596 (1973) (Illinois cases).
Perhaps another reason for all of the confusion arises because vested rights cases are infre-
quent. The bulk of the cases seem to have arisen in four states: New York, Pennsylvania,
Illinois, and California. Each state follows a different rule. New York uses the set quantum
test to determine a vested right. California uses the same test but concentrates instead on the
elements of equitable estoppel. Illinois uses the balancing test. Pennsylvania uses the pending
ordinance rule. Most other states have followed the New York rule, but these states have so
few cases that it is difficult to tell whether there is an established rule or not.
Reliance appears most important in the California estoppel doctrine and the New York
vested right doctrine. In the Illinois balancing test, reliance is only one factor to be considered
in balancing the equities. Under the Pennsylvania test it is unclear whether reliance must
occur before or after the pendency of the ordinance, if at all. See North Coventry Twp. v.
Silver Fox Corp., 10 Pa. Commw. Ct. 646, 312 A.2d 833 (1973) (permit could be revoked under
the authority of a newly enacted zoning ordinance when there was little evidence of reliance
upon it after fifteen months).
Other states continue to require substantial reliance upon the permit for any rights to vest.
See, e.g., Thomas v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 381 A.2d 643 (Me. 1978); Boise City v. Blaser, 98
Idaho 789, 572 P.2d 892 (1977); Robert Randall Co. v. City of Milwaukie, 32 Or. App. 631, 575
P.2d 170 (1978). See also Cunningham & Kremer, supra note 58, at 676-710 (summary of
California's rules).
66. Heeter, supra note 17, at 89.
67. Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968). See notes 16-32
and accompanying text supra.
68. Heeter, supra note 17, at 89. Heeter was writing in 1971 and, of course, did not have
the benefit of the later pending ordinance rule cases.
pending ordinance rule, it is doubtful whether Pennsylvania still ap-
plies this test. Thus, the determination of whether a landowner has
relied on a permit that has created a vested right by being properly
issued prior to the pendency of an ordinance or amendment is still
necessary. The commonwealth court has indicated that "the ob-
taining of a permit and an outlay of money or an incurring of liabili-
ties is required to confer a vested right to proceed contrary to new
regulations.
' 69
Only two other states, Washington and South Carolina, use a
similar rule7° and Washington has not applied it consistently.7' This
rule has the serious flaw of exposing local governments to the threat
of a flood of applications whenever an extensive zoning change is
contemplated.72 The pending ordinance rule has partially rectified
this problem since an ordinance is considered pending earlier in the
process,73 which shortens the time for any last minute applications
and decreases the likelihood that a landowner will know of a propo-
sal before its advertisement. Moreover, the question of when the ex-
penditures must be made in order to indicate reliance upon a permit
also arises. The general rule in Pennsylvania74 is that expenditures
made before the issuance of a permit do not indicate any reliance on
the permit and are not relevant to the determination of whether
rights have vested because of expenditures.75 Likewise, the issuance
of a building permit for partial development of a tract and comple-
tion of that portion of the development does not constitute sufficient
reliance to create a vested right in future building permits for the
completion of the project,7 6 which might be applied for after the zon-
ing change.77 Furthermore, expenditures of a general nature-for
improvements that could also be used if the property were used in
conformance with the subsequent ordinance or amendment-will
not be counted in determining substantial reliance.
78
69. Colonial Park for Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 594,
601, 290 A.2d 719, 723 (1972) (also indicating that Gallagher is an exception to the rule).
70. See note 30 supra.
71. Id
72. Heeter, supra note 17, at 90.
73. See notes 43-44 and accompanying text supra.
74. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974); Boron Oil Co. v.
Kimple, 445 Pa. 327, 284 A.2d 744 (1971).
75. This appears to be the rule in almost all jurisdictions with the notable exception of
Illinois. See, e.g., Cos Corp. v. City of Evanston, 27 Ill. 2d 570, 190 N.E.2d 364 (1963); Nott v.
Wolff, 18 II. 2d 362, 163 N.E.2d 809 (1960). See also 3 A. RATHKOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING
AND PLANNING, ch. 57, §§ 4, 5 (4th ed. 1978). In Virginia, expenditures under use permits, but
before issuance of building permits, have been held to be substantial reliance. Fairfax County
v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972).
76. See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
77. Beverly Bldg. Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 409 Pa. 417, 187 A.2d 567 (1963); Logan
v. Bickel, 11 Pa. D. & C.2d 405, 43 Del. 272 (C.P. 1956).
78. Dunlap Appeal, 370 Pa. 31, 87 A.2d 299 (1952) (sewer lateral installed in anticipation
of row home development could be used for permitted detached dwellings equally well): Clo-
ver Hill Farms, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 239, 241, 289 A.2d 778, 779
Although the pending ordinance rule does add a certainty to the
determination of when a right vests, it does not completely eliminate
the problem of finding substantial reliance. The courts, the legisla-
ture, or the local municipality itself 9 must develop one test for reli-
ance and apply it consistently.80
2. The Requirement of Good Faith on the Part of the Permit-
tee.-The earlier Pennsylvania cases implied that to establish a
vested right under a validly issued permit, expenditures made in reli-
ance upon it had to be made in good faith.8 ' It was not until 1966,
however, in Penn Township v. Yecko Bros. ,82 that the supreme court
stated the rule explicitly:
The rule ... is that a property owner who is able to demonstrate
(1) that he has obtained a valid building permit under the old zon-
ing ordinance, (2) that he got it in good faith-that is to say with-
out "racing" to get it before a proposed change was made in the
zoning ordinance-and (3) that in good faith he spent money or
incurred liabilities in reliance on his building permit has acquired
a vested right and need not conform with the zoning ordinance as
changed.8-
Although this case was decided under Pennsylvania's original rule, 4
the progression through Gallagher
85 to the pending ordinance rule8 6
has not relaxed the requirement of good faith on the part of the per-
mittee s7 The court developed this rule in an attempt to prevent
landowners from racing to establish a use or to get a permit8 8 before
(1972) (expenditure of $3,000 for activities not unique to mobile home park did not establish
pre-existing use as such a park).
79. This can be done by a "saving clause" in the zoning ordinance itself, a device little
used in Pennsylvania. See, e.g., City of Harrisburg v. Pass, 372 Pa. 318, 93 A.2d 447 (1953);
Rapho Twp. v. Model Enterprises, Inc., 4 Pa. Commw. Ct. 163, 286 A.2d 490 (1972). A saving
clause is a provision in the zoning ordinance that specifically exempts construction undertaken
before its effective date from its provisions.
80. See notes 105-115 and accompanying text infra.
81. See, e.g., Lened Homes, Inc. v. Philadelphia Dept. of Licenses and Inspections, 386
Pa. 50, 123 A.2d 406 (1956); A.J. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105
A.2d 586 (1954); Herskovits v. Irwin, 299 Pa. 155, 149 A. 195 (1930).
82. 402 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966).
83. Id at 390, 217 A.2d at 173.
84. See notes 7-15 and accompanying text supra.
85. See notes 16-32 and accompanying text supra.
86. See notes 33-53 and accompanying text supra.
87. Cases since Gallagher requiring good faith on the part of the permittee include Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Township Bd. of Supervisors, 438 Pa. 457, 266 A.2d 84 (1970); Camaron Apts.,
Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct. 571, 324 A.2d 805 (1974); Hodge v.
Zoning Hearing Bd., 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 311, 312 A.2d 813 (1973); City of Pittsburgh v.
Oakhouse Assocs., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 349, 301 A.2d 387 (1973).
88. The fact situation in Penn Twp. v. Yecko Bros., 420 Pa. 386, 217 A.2d 171 (1966) is
typical. The municipality had been considering the adoption of a zoning ordinance for three
years. On June 28, 1962 the proposed ordinance was advertised and a public hearing was to be
held on July 17, 1962. The ordinance was subsequently enacted on August 13, 1962 and be-
came effective on August 23, 1962. In the meantime, on July 2, 1962 the Yeckos made ar-
rangements to purchase four acres of ground for an automobile parts business and wrecking
yard and on July 9, 1962 appeared at a public meeting of the township supervisors to request
approval. The supervisors referred them to the planning and zoning commission for approval
and advised them of the forthcoming public hearing. Without obtaining any approval, on July
a zoning ordinance became effective or legally pending.89 Both the
second and third elements of the Yecko test must be met for good
faith to be found.9"
3. The Requirement of Good Faith on the Part of the Municipal-
ity.-Not surprisingly, Pennsylvania courts have also found that a
municipality must act in good faith in revoking a permit or in deny-
ing an application for a permit.9 The leading Pennsylvania case on
municipal bad faith is Shapiro v. Board of Adjustment.92 The pro-
posed zoning amendment here93 was aimed expressly at plaintiffs
property and proposed use.94 The court held that this was a "trans-
parent attempt to thwart effectually Shapiro's purpose to use the
property for an amusement park."95
Of all the requirements for a vested right to arise, the court is
most sensitive to an amendment or ordinance aimed specifically at
the applicant's property. In Lower Merion Township v. Frankel,96 the
court declared that because of the discriminatory nature of an
amendment, the applicant had acquired a vested right to proceed as
if the amendment had never been passed.97 A court, therefore, is
28, 1962 Yecko Bros. moved on the property, installed a used bus as an office, placed wrecked
automobiles on the premises and erected a sign. Between that date and August 4, 1962 Yecko
Bros. transacted business amounting to $109.50. Since Yecko Bros. did not even attempt to
secure a permit, the court held that this was racing in bad faith to create a nonconforming use.
89. AJ. Aberman, Inc. v. City of New Kensington, 377 Pa. 520, 105 A.2d 586 (1954) (no
vested right in permit when permittee was racing to construct shopping center in face of zoning
ordinance prohibiting its construction).
90. Good faith reliance on the part of the permittee is also an absolute requirement
before an equitable estoppel against a municipality can be found. See note 58 supra and
Heeter, supra note 17, at 66.
91. See, e.g., Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960) Shapiro v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954); Lower Merion Twp. v. Frankel, 358 Pa. 430, 57
A.2d 900 (1948). Cf. Appeal of Klein, 395 Pa. 157, 149 A.2d 114 (1959) (no rule cited, munici-
pal bad faith implied); Gallagher v. Building Inspector, 432 Pa. 301, 247 A.2d 572 (1968)
(municipal bad faith implied, not explicitly offered as basis for decision).
92. 377 Pa. 621, 105 A.2d 299 (1954).
93. The preamble to the ordinance enacting the zoning change contained the following
language: "Whereas, There appears to be the possibility of the establishment of such an
amusement park immediately adjoining a residential district in northwest Philadelphia prior to
the enactment of [the proposed amendatory ordinance]." Id at 625, 105 A.2d at 301.
94. Prior to March 1953 Shapiro leased ground in an "A" commercial district on which
he wished to construct a kiddie amusement park, a permitted use. On March 18, 1953, he
applied for the appropriate permits. The application was denied, and Shapiro appealed to the
Board of Adjustment, which dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the use was not permit-
ted, that there was no hardship to the applicant, and that establishment of such a park would
be detrimental to the neighborhood. Shapiro then appealed to the court of common pleas. On
May 25, 1953, an ordinance designed to prevent the establishment of amusement parks in an
"A" commercial district, except when authorized as a special exception, was introduced into
City Council and enacted on July 23, 1953. In the meantime the court ordered issuance of a
permit to Shapiro on June 25, 1953, and he actually received it on July 10, 1953. On August
13, 1953, the Department of Licenses and Inspections revoked the permit because of the newly
enacted amendment, but after Shapiro had incurred expenditure in reliance on the permit.
95. 377 Pa. at 625, 105 A.2d at 301.
96. 358 Pa. 430, 57 A.2d 900 (1948).
97. Pennsylvania courts traditionally have been hostile to attempts of municipalities to
frustrate applicants. Casey v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 459 Pa. 219, 328 A.2d 464 (1974) (Munici-
much more likely to find a vested right in a permit or application if it
determines that the reason the applicant was unsuccessful or the per-
mittee had his permit revoked was because of a municipal act aimed
directly at him.9
4. Effect of the Nature of the Applicant and Intended Use of the
Property on Vested Rights.-The nature of the applicant and the in-
tended use of the property may also influence the court in its deci-
sion on whether a right vests in a permit or application. For
example, because of first amendment implications, churches are
treated with utmost care in zoning cases99 and therefore receive
vested rights more liberally than other land users."l° In addition,
Pennsylvania courts disfavor municipal activity aimed at zoning out
particular individuals or uses and have used language that is
stronger than necessary in striking down such special legislation or
in finding a vested right.'' These cases have confused the issue of
vested rights rather than clarifying it and have added little to the
development of a comprehensive, widely applicable rule.
E Some Proposals
After years of confusion Pennsylvania's vested rights rules are
emerging with some clarity and some promise of consistent applica-
tion. The pending ordinance rule 0 2 is an acceptable determinant of
when rights vest and can be applied consistently. With one major
exception 0 3 the rule is fair to both the landowner seeking to develop
his property and to the municipality seeking to protect the health,
safety, and welfare of its citizens. The major improvement needed is
some control over property owners who, when they hear rumors of
palities Planning Code could not be used to prevent challenger from obtaining meaningful
relief after successful attack on zoning ordinance); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395
(1970); Raum v. Board of Supervisors, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 9, 370 A.2d 777 (1977) (fifty-four
page diatribe aimed at municipal officials).
98. Under these circumstances, a court could reach the same result by declaring an
amendment aimed directly at one property invalid as spot zoning. A spot zoning argument
will arise if the amendment has the effect of rezoning a small tract or single property differ-
ently from all of the land surrounding it. See Appeal of Mulac, 418 Pa. 207, 210 A.2d 275
(1965).
99. See Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 377 (1960). See also Westchester Reform Temple v. Brown,
22 N.Y.2d 488, 239 N.E.2d 891 (1968) (religious structures enjoy constitutionally protected
status severely curtailing permissible extent of governmental regulation in the name of police
powers).
100. Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960). An inexplicitly acknowledged
basis of Yocum was municipal bad faith.
101. Appeal of Klein, 395 Pa. 157, 149 A.2d 114 (1959) (vested rights rules never men-
tioned, agricultural use); Linda Dev. Corp. v. Plymouth Twp., 3 Pa. Commw. Ct. 334, 281
A.2d 784 (1971) (zoning amendment was special legislation, vested rights not discussed); Lime-
kiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, I Pa. Commw. Ct. 499, 275 A.2d 896
(1971) (special legislation; vested rights not mentioned but municipal bad faith cases such as
Yocum cited).
102. See notes 33-53 and accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra.
zoning changes, rush to acquire permits and then hold them. This
improvement can be accomplished by fixing a time limit during
which a permit acquired in good faith will remain valid."o To retain
the fairness inherent in the rule, a time limitation must be fixed dur-
ing which the municipal governing body can act on a proposed ordi-
nance or amendment after it is first advertised.
10 5
These improvements could be accomplished judicially, but since
the supreme court rarely hears zoning cases" 6 they could be ob-
tained more appropriately by an amendment0 7 to the Municipalities
Planning Code. 10  An amendment to its article on zoning, 0 9 such as
the following example, would suffice.
(a) For the purpose of determining whether a building permit or
zoning permit creates a vested right in the permittee to estab-
fish a use or structure that is to be prohibited by a proposed
zoning ordinance or amendment, such ordinance or amend-
ment is deemed to be pending on the day on which it is first
advertised to the public for hearings by the planning com-
mission. A permit issued after that date for a use or structure
that will not be permitted under the proposed ordinance or
amendment is not valid and creates no vested right.
(b) The governing body of the municipality shall receive a rec-
ommendation on the proposal from the planning commission
within - days of the date of such advertisement and shall
take action on such proposal within - days of such advertise-
ment. If such action is not taken, the ordinance or amend-
ment is no longer pending.
(c) A valid building or zoning permit issued before the date of
advertisement of the proposal shall remain valid after the
date of such advertisement and shall create a vested right in
104. Sixty or ninety days seems to be a reasonable limit on the validity of a permit, with,
perhaps, a possibility of renewal if the developer runs into unforeseen difficulties or the pro-
posed amendment or ordinance has not yet been enacted.
105. A municipal governing body should not be able to keep a proposed ordinance pend-
ing indefinitely simply by allowing the appropriate commission to advertise the ordinance and
hold a hearing on it, and then refusing to take action within a reasonable time after the com-
mission's recommendation. Six months from the date of first advertisement to final decision
by the governing body should be adequate to give the proposal consideration. More time
might benefit the municipality by preventing it from feeling rushed, but then landowners in the
affected area would be foreclosed from doing anything with their land other than what is
permitted in the proposed ordinance. Nine months should be the maximum permitted period.
106. Since 1970 all zoning cases are heard by the commonwealth court. See Judicial Code
of 1976, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 721-726 (Purdon Supp. 1979). An appeal from the com-
monwealth court to the supreme court is discretionary and is granted by the affirmative vote of
any two supreme court justices. 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 724 (Purdon Supp. 1979). See
also PA. R. APP. P. §§ 1111-1123.
107. At least one state has legislation addressing rights that accrue to a permit. See, e.g.,
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 40A, § 6 (West Supp. 1978). See also MODEL LAND DEVELOP-
MENT CODE § 2-309(l)(c) (1976) (recognizing a vested right based on an application for a
permit; similar to the pending ordinance rule).
108. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10101-11202 (Purdon 1972) (hereanafter cited as MPC).
The Municipalities Planning Code was passed in 1968 to repeal the sections dealing with plan-
ning and zoning in the various city, borough, and township codes. The MPC now provides a
uniform statutory framework for planning, zoning, and subdivision regulation in all of the
state's municipalities except Philadelphia.
109. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, §§ 10601-10619 (Purdon 1972).
the permittee to use it for its intended purpose. The munici-
pality may attach a time limit to the permit during which the
permittee must begin his proposed construction or lose his
vested right to proceed. Such time limit may be fixed by the
municipality, but in no case shall it be less than - days. ' 0
Another possibility is to include in the zoning ordinance a "sav-
ing clause" that offers protection from zoning changes to owners who
have applied for or received a permit prior to the change.I" This
scheme has been rarely used in Pennsylvania,II2 but it does offer the
possibility of further clarification of the vested rights dilemma.
III. Vested Rights in Reliance Upon an Erroneously Issued
Permit
In contrast to the confusion that prevailed during the develop-
ment of rules concerning whether a vested right was created by a
valid permit, the Pennsylvania law dealing with vested rights created
by an erroneously issued or invalid permit has developed without
confusion and has been consistently applied."I3 Dealing with an in-
valid permit, however, is simpler than dealing with a valid permit. If
the permit is not valid, it should never have been issued, and had it
not been issued no rights of any sort could vest in the applicant. In
exceptional cases innocent reliance upon a permit may be sufficient
to convince the court that the permittee did have a vested right de-
spite the invalidity of the permit.' 
4
A. The General Rule
The Pennsylvania version of the rule was first stated in Vogt v.
Port Vue Borough. ' 5
A municipal permit issued illegally or in violation of the law, or
under a mistake of fact, confers no vested right or privilege on the
person to whom the permit has been issued and may be revoked
notwithstanding that he may have acted upon the permit; any ex-
penditures made in reliance upon such permit are made at his
peril. 1
6
The court held that the borough manager properly revoked a permit
that had been issued mistakenly two days earlier by the burgess and
the borough engineer.
1 7
110. These provisions logically would be inserted in the MPC between § 609.2 and § 610.
111. This device is relatively new, but its use is increasing. See Annot., 49 A.L.R.3d 1150
(1973).
112. See note 79 supra. See also Township of Radnor v. Civitella, 43 Del. 192 (Pa. C.P.
1956) (saving clause in zoning ordinance gave defendant a vested right).
113. The rule is the same in all jurisdictions. See Heeter, supra note 17, at 73-75 (noting
courts have reached the result in widely varying ways).
114. See notes 121-29 and accompanying text infra.
115. 170 Pa. Super. Ct. 526, 85 A.2d 688 (1952).
116. Id at 528, 85 A.2d at 690.
117. The applicant applied for a permit to construct a gas station in a commercial zone
and was issued one by the burgess. Gas stations were not a permitted use in commercial zones
Commonwealth court decisions have adhered to this rule. ' 8
Unlike the rules applying to validly issued permits, 9 the rule apply-
ing to erroneously issued or invalid permits has been consistently
stated. 120
B. The Exception
The commonwealth court has recognized that the strict applica-
tion of this rule can cause hardship. Instead of dealing with this situ-
ation on a case-by-case basis, the court in Department of
Environmental Resources v. Flynn 12  developed a set of guidelines
defining when an exception to the general rule would be found. The
elements require
(1) [the permittee's] due diligence in attempting to comply with
the law;
(2) his good faith throughout the proceedings;
(3) the expenditure by him of substantial unrecoverable funds;
(4) the expiration without appeal of the period during which an
appeal could have been taken from the issuance of the per-
mit;
(5) the insufficiency of the evidence to prove that individual
property rights or the public health, safety or welfare would
be adversely affected by the use of the permit. '
22
This test is straightforward and easy to apply, with the exception of
the fourth element, which needs clarification in future decisions.
123
and the borough manager promptly revoked the permit on learning of its issuance. The appli-
cant had entered into a construction contract, but had not otherwise relied on the permit.
118. Pae v. Hiltown Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 385 A.2d 616
(1978); Appeal of Donofrio, 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 579, 377 A.2d 1017 (1977); Kirk v. Smay, 28
Pa. Commw. Ct. 13, 367 A.2d 760 (1976); Zoning Hearing Bd. v. Petrosky, 26 Pa. Commw. Ct.
614, 365 A.2d 184 (1976); Klavon v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 22, 340 A.2d 631
(1975); Houser v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 313, 341 A.2d 566 (1975); City of
Pittsburgh v. Oakhouse Associates, 8 Pa. Commw. Ct., 349, 301 A.2d 387 (1973); cf. Ventresca
v. Exley, 358 Pa. 98, 56 A.2d 210 (1948) (improperly granted variance; used as analogy to
develop the rule).
119. See Section II supra.
120. See, e.g., Appeal of Donofrio, 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 579, 582, 377 A.2d 1017, 1018
(1977) (citing Klavon v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 20 Pa. Commw. Ct. 22, 340 A.2d 631 (1975));
Herbel v. Middletown Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 32 Bucks I (Pa. C.P. 1978); DeVitis v. Board
of Supervisors, 18 Chest. 139 (Pa. C.P. 1969); Appeal of Sukthankar, 58 Del. 91 (Pa. C.P.
1970), rev'd on other grounds, 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 489, 280 A.2d 467 (1971); Montgomery
County Mental Health Clinics, Inc. v. Norristown Borough, 90 Montg. 200 (Pa. C.P. 1968);
Franchise Enterprises v. Spring Garden Twp., 76 York 97 (Pa. C.P. 1962); Smith v. Bristol
Twp. Zoning Bd., 4 Bucks 131 (Pa. C.P. 1954) (building 90% complete).
121. 21 Pa. Commw. Ct. 264, 344 A.2d 720 (1975). In Flynn, the permittee was errone-
ously issued a permit to install a septic tank and in reliance thereon, he began construction of a
home. When it was about 75% completed, representatives of the Department of Environmen-
tal Resources (DER) visited the site and found that because of the high water table, the permit
should not have been issued. DER thereupon attempted to halt construction and Flynn ap-
pealed. The court felt that under these circumstances, the invalid permit did create a vested
right. See also Turner v. Martz, - Pa. Commw. Ct. -, 401 A.2d 585 (1979), which summa-
rizes the invalid permit cases, applies the Flnn test, and finds that a township and its sewage
enforcement officer could be held liable for negligence in the issuance of a sewer permit for a
septic system that failed to function after its installation.
122. Id at 272, 344 A.2d at 725.
123. Presumably the Department should have appealed the issuance of the permit if it was
Flynn, which dealt with a septic tank permit, was soon extended to a
zoning case. In Zoning Hearing Board of Upper Chichester Township
v. Petrosky24 the court applied the Fynn test and found that an
erroneously issued building permit did not create a vested right in
defendants. 25 At least one lower court has also applied the Flynn
test in determining if there is an exception to the general rule.
126
With the exception of the fourth guideline that might not apply
in all situations, 27 the others to be considered as a part of the Flynn
test are reasonable. If the permittee complies with all of them his
rights should vest by virtue of the permit, even if it is clear that the
permit should not have been issued. The fifth element will protect
neighboring property owners and the citizens of the municipality
from the incompetence of its officials by denying a vested right to a
property owner who meets the other four criteria of the test. A
vested right will not be found in an erroneous permit if it will ad-
versely affect the public or harm neighboring properties. 28 The ex-
ceptions should be found sparingly. 
29
IV. Vested Right in Municipal Inaction or Failure to Enforce
A. The General Rule
The equitable doctrine of laches 3 ° is not ordinarily applicable
incorrect, but this fact was not discovered until after the appeal period had passed. The court
may also be referring to a situation like that which developed in Flood v. Zoning Hearing Bd.,
19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 427, 338 A.2d 789 (1975), in which the court held that even if property
owners expend money or incur liabilities in good faith reliance upon a building permit, they
acquire no vested right until expiration of the period during which other affected property
owners might appeal the hearing board's decision. Such appeals, however, are unavailable for
non-zoning cases as in the issuance of septic tank permits. Perhaps the court was formulating
a general statement of exceptions and the fourth factor was not meant to be applicable to the
particular situation in Flynn. In a future decision, the court should specify the circumstances
under which an appeal should be taken and by whom it should be taken.
124. 26 Pa. Commw. Ct. 614, 365 A.2d 184 (1976). After this comment went to press, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Petrosky v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 298 Jan. Term 1977, filed
July 6, 1979, adopted the five-part test for an exception established by the Commonwealth
Court, but reversed on the facts, finding a vested right.
125. In Petrosky defendants had already constructed the structure, which had been erro-
neously permitted to violate setback requirements, and were ordered to remove it.
126. See Herbel v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 32 Bucks 1 (Pa. C.P. 1978).
127. See note 123 supra.
128. The court has recognized that the reason for requiring a permit in the first place is to
protect the public welfare--the general justification for any exercise of the police power. Any
local ordinance requiring a permit, whether a zoning ordinance or some other type of ordi-
nance, is an exercise of the police power.
129. A contrary rule would lead to chaos in municipal affairs. If the doctrine of es-
toppel could be invoked in such situations, municipalities would repeatedly find
themselves bound by the unauthorized acts of officers and agents possessing only
limited authority. Experience has shown the wisdom of the prevailing rule that per-
sons dealing with municipal officers and agents are bound by constructive notice of
the law and public records with respect to the powers and functions of such officers
and agents.
Alexander Co. v. City of Owatonna, 22 Minn. 321, -, 24 N.W.2d 244, 250 (1946). See also
Annot., 6 A.L.R.2d 960 (1949).
130. Laches is neglect for unreasonable and unexplained time, under circumstances per-
to a municipality, 13' but a number of cases have considered it in de-
termining whether a vested right may be created by municipal inac-
tivity or nonenforcement of its ordinances. The general rule was
formulated in Hasage v. Philadelphia Zoning Board ofAdustment.
32
After reviewing the complex fact situation in Hasage, 33 the court
held that inactivity on the part of the municipality does not create a
vested right in a landowner to continue using his property not in
conformance with the provisions of an applicable zoning ordinance.
The court also declared that the landowner's ignorance of the non-
conforming use was irrelevant and inexcusable.
It is argued that the applicants purchased the property thinking
multiple family dwelling was permissible, and, acting on such be-
lief, made an investment of approximately $36,000. The answer to
that is that they were duty bound to check the zoning status of the
property before purchase, . . . If the records had been searched, it
would have been immediately revealed that the zoning board had
refused to permit multiple dwelling within a few years before title
to the property was purchased.'
34
With a few exceptions, 35 the appellate courts in Pennsylvania
have continued to hold that laches is not a defense in an action to
enforce a zoning ordinance. They have also generally continued to
hold that a longstanding violation of a zoning ordinance, in itself,
does not create a right to continue the violation. 136 This is the ma-
jority position among the states.
137
mitting diligence, to do what in law should have been done. Brodt v. Brown, 404 Pa. 391, 172
A.2d 152 (1961). The essence of laches is estoppel arising out of inexcusable delay in the
bringing of suit, which delay prejudices the defendant's rights to such an extent that it would
be an injustice to permit suit to be brought. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n v. Atlantic Rich-
field Co., 31 Pa. Commw. Ct. 212, 375 A.2d 890 (1977).
131. Breisch v. Locust Mountain Coal Co., 267 Pa. 546, 110 A. 242 (1920).
132. 415 Pa. 31, 202 A.2d 61 (1964).
133. In 1951 the Board of Adjustment refused the owner of a single family dwelling per-
mission to convert the structure to a multi-family dwelling because such use would violate the
zoning ordinance, which permitted only single family dwellings. The owner converted the
home into a five-family unit anyway. In 1956 Hasage bought the property as a five-family unit
for $26,000 and expended $10,000 more in improvements. In 1962, during a routine inspec-
tion, the city became aware of the violation for the first time, served a notice thereof on
Hasage, and later refused to grant a variance. Hasage then appealed this decision.
134. Hasage v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 415 Pa. 31, 35, 202 A.2d 61, 64
(1964).
135. See notes 138-59 and accompanying text infra.
136. Pae v. Hilltown Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 35 Pa. Commw. Ct. 229, 385 A.2d 616
(1978) (two years); Marzo v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 30 Pa. Commw. Ct. 225, 373 A.2d 463 (1977)
(ten to fifteen years); Milewski v. City of Philadelphia, 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 59, 365 A.2d 680
(1976) (eighteen years); Lewis v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 24 Pa. Commw. Ct. 574, 357 A.2d 725
(1976) (fifteen years); Camaron Apts., Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 14 Pa. Commw. Ct.
571, 324 A.2d 805 (1974) (seven years); Dewald v. Board of Adjustment, 13 Pa. Commw. Ct.
303, 320 A.2d 922 (1974) (six years). But see Cities Service Oil Co. v. City of Des Plaines, 21
Ill. 2d 157, 171 N.E.2d 605 (1961) (seven month delay on the part of the city amounted to
ratification by the city of an invalid permit).
137. See Heeter, supra note 17, at 75-77. Illinois has found exceptions in Westfield v. City
of Chicago, 26 Ill. 2d 526, 187 N.E.2d 208 (1962) and City of Evanston v. Robbins, 117 Ill.
App. 2d 278, 254 N.E.2d 536 (1969). See also City of Passaic v. H.B. Reed & Co., 70 N.J.
Super. 542, 176 A.2d 27 (1961). No Pennsylvania cases are within an exception, but there are a
few discussed at notes 138-59 and accompanying text infra.
B. The Exceptions
A few cases have been decided contrary to the general rule. Al-
though the supreme court did not actually specify the exact reasons
why it found a vested right in the municipal inaction or nonenforce-
ment in any of these cases, these decisions do fall into interrelated
but definable categories.
1. Great Hardship and Substantial Reliance by Owner.-This
exception is concerned with the extreme hardship that strict enforce-
ment of the zoning ordinance would impose on a landowner because
of his reliance upon the action of the municipality in permitting the
violation to continue. The exception is usually applied to a pur-
chaser of a property who had no way of knowing that a land use
violation was present.' 38 The leading case applying this doctrine is
Sheedy v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 39 in which the
Board of Adjustment, in denying an application for a variance,14°
gave no notice to the owner that the present use was actually in vio-
lation of the zoning ordinance.
14 1
The court in Hasage v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjust-
ment 42 distinguished and confined Sheedy to its facts and estab-
lished a three part test to determine if this type of exception existed:
(1) the nonconforming use must have existed for a long period of
time; (2) the municipality must have permitted the illegal use to con-
tinue unchallenged despite knowledge of its existence and must have
indicated that the use was not objectionable; (3) the cost of bringing
the structure into compliance must be prohibitive. 
14
138. Contra, Hasage v. Philadelphia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 415 Pa. 31, 202 A.2d 61
(1964) (purchaser should have known of the violation).
139. 409 Pa. 655, 187 A.2d 907 (1963).
140. Sheedy had purchased the property after the previous owner had used it as a multiple
dwelling for nineteen years in violation of the zoning ordinance. The previous owner had been
denied a variance to change the use, but in denying it the Board gave no indication that the
multiple dwelling use violated the ordinance. Sheedy continued to use the property for five
years before the city took any action. The court found that reconversion of the dwelling to a
single family unit would be ruinously expensive and wasteful, especially since the use was
causing no harm to the public health, safety, or welfare.
141. Compare Koenen v. Lower Merion Twp., 85 Montg. 93 (Pa. C.P. 1965) (purchaser for
value unaware of violation), with Saylor v. Lower Merion Twp., 85 Montg. 96 (Pa. C.P. 1965)
(adjacent properties) (landowner knowing of violation).
142. 415 Pa. 31, 202 A.2d 61 (1964).
143. Sheedy was a singular situation and presented at least three factors which do not
appear in the present case: (1) The multiple-family dwelling or non-conforming use,
had existed for a score of years, in fact, almost from the date of passage of the zoning
ordinance; (2) The city had permitted the illegal use to continue without challenge for
twenty-three years despite knowledge of its existence, and pursued a course of con-
duct that indicated multiple tenancy was not objectionable; (3) It was clearly estab-
lished that the cost of conversion to a single dwelling would be enormous and
prohibitive.
Id at 36, 202 A.2d at 64.
The key point, which is absolutely necessary to establish the exception, is that the munici-
pality must permit the violation to continue after it becomes aware of the violation. In Sheedy
the city knew of the violation when the variance was denied, but waited five years before it
This exception is well-founded, especially when both the second
and third elements of the test are strongly present or when the land-
owner did not create the violation, but was a good faith purchaser.
Because of the substantial reliance permitted by a municipality
knowing of a violation, it is reasonable to apply the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel to the municipality in this situation.'44
2. Extreme Length of Time During Which Violation is Permitted
to Continue with Knowledge of the Municiality.-If a municipality
knows or should have known of a violation of its zoning ordinance
and the violation has continued for a long time without any munici-
pal action to abate it, the court may find that the landowner has
acquired a vested right to continue the use.' 45 This is especially true
when the violation was authorized by the municipality with an im-
properly issued permit that was never revoked.'46 The common-
wealth court has found that this constitutes sufficient detrimental
reliance on the apparent acquiescence of the municipality1 47 to enti-
tle the owner to a vested right. 148
3. De Minimis Nature of Violation. -If the violation is of a mi-
nor nature having no effect on the public health, safety, or welfare,
the court may find that the property owner has a vested right to con-
tinue to use his land in violation of the ordinance. '4  The leading
case in which this exception is found, Heidorn Appeal, 50 is aberrant
took any type of action. In Hasage, however, the violation persisted for some eleven years, but
the city issued a cease and desist order almost immediately upon becoming aware of the viola-
tion.
144. The court must balance any harm to the citizens of the municipality or the adjoining
landowners against the harm suffered by the owner who has relied on the municipality's inac-
tivity. This may be implied in the three factor test used in determining this exception, but
should be more clearly stated, perhaps as a distinct fourth element. See also notes 128-29 and
accompanying text supra.
145. Township of Haverford v. Spica, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 326, 328 A.2d 878 (1974) (viola-
tion continued for thirty-six years). A court might also conceivably find a vested right in the
willful violation of an ordinance, if the local government permits the violation to persist for
many years.
146. Id The township had issued a permit for establishment of a real estate office in a
residential zone, a use that was not permitted in the zone in 1938. The permit was never
revoked.
147. [T]he township not only permitted construction of a structure, the obvious use of
which was in violation of the ordinance, but it also did the affirmative act of sanction-
ing the construction and use through the issuance of its own building permit. The
Township was then silent for thirty-six years. In such circumstances we believe the
property owner is entitled to rely on the Township's apparent acquiescence.
Id at 333, 328 A.2d at 882.
148. To correct the erroneous issuance of an outstanding permit, some jurisdictions allow
an action of mandamus against the appropriate municipal official to revoke an invalid permit.
See Annot., 68 A.L.R.3d 166 (1976) (no Pennsylvania cases cited). This device has never been
used in Pennsylvania, but it should prove useful in those situations where an invalid permit
has been issued and the municipality takes no action to revoke it.
149. This characterization is found in R. RYAN, PENNSYLVANIA ZONING LAW AND PRAC-
TICE, § 8.3.4 (1970).
150. 412 Pa. 570, 195 A.2d 349 (1963).
and potentially dangerous. 151 It focuses more on the nature of the
appellant than on the nature of the violation. 52 Moreover, the case
continues to be cited for the proposition that laches can be applied
against a municipality. 53 Yet nowhere in the opinion is there any
language to indicate how the court reached its decision. 5 4 No other
cases are cited in support. Thus, the only rational basis for the deci-
sion is the de minimis nature of the violation. 55
This decision does not have much merit; if the court feels that
the doctrine of laches should be applied to a municipality because of
its inaction, it should at least offer a reason for applying the doctrine.
Furthermore, unlike the other possible exceptions found by the
courts, 5 6 this one is not well founded. A violation is a violation, and
the court should be very reluctant to find a vested right in an unen-
forced zoning ordinance simply because the violation was not major.
The rule would be more reasonable, however, if the landowner had
to show that the violation does not harm the community or the use,
enjoyment, and value of adjoining property, and that it was created
or continued in good faith and at substantial expense to the property
owner.
C. The Result
The Pennsylvania cases dealing with vested rights created by
municipal inaction follow the majority rule and find that municipal
151. See Yocum v. Power, 398 Pa. 223, 157 A.2d 368 (1960).
152. The appellants were an elderly couple whose new front porch violated by five and a
half feet a setback ordinance requiring a twenty-five foot setback. The old front porch had
violated the ordinance by an even greater amount, but the township had ignored the violation
for ten years. Seventy-five homeowners in the vicinity signed a petition supporting the appel-
lants, and from that fact the court found no detrimental effect on the health, safety, and wel-
fare of the community. Nor did the court find detrimental reliance on any affirmative
municipal act, and it surely seems that appellants should have checked the setback require-
ments before building a new porch. Nothing indicates that a building permit had been issued
for the construction, but the court still applied the doctrine of laches against the municipality.
153. See, e.g., Township of Haverford v. Spica, 16 Pa. Commw. Ct. 326, 328 A.2d 878
(1974).
154. The opinion does contain the following interesting language:
The Township stands not on a logical platform but on a dialectical stoop to argue its
case. It says that if the Heidorns are permitted to retain their patios then every
"property owner in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania" is entitled to have a front
porch and that therefore building setback lines will become a "nullity." This is like
worrying that the oceans will some day go dry. The law, while concerned about the
future, focuses its attention on the immediate problem at hand and cannot allow an
injustice to occur on the theory that a certain decision will become a ghost to haunt
posterity. It cannot be influenced by the argument that if a certain privilege is al-
lowed a hunchback, the whole world will become humpbacked.
The short answer to the appellant's thesis in this field is that if our decision
becomes a precedent to allow other exceptions to setback requirements, so let it be.
Heidorn Appeal, 412 Pa. 570, 575, 195 A.2d 349, 352 (1963).
155. There may be legally irrelevant explanation. The appellants apparently were elderly
and had just spent a good deal of money on a new porch. They should have been presumed,
however, to know the law as well as anyone else, in the absence of any affirmative municipal
action.
156. See notes 138-48 and accompanying text supra.
inaction does not create a vested right.'57 This body of law is not as
consistent as that dealing with vested rights accruing on the basis of
an invalid permit. The exceptions and the reasoning behind them
are not as well thought out as those in the invalid permit situation. 58
Courts should develop a set of criteria to use as a test for finding
exceptions. The three criteria developed to show that Sheedy was an
exception are a starting point.' 59 To them must be added some con-
sideration of the public health, safety, and welfare and of the rights
of neighboring property owners that might be affected. Courts
should avoid ad hoc application of the doctrine, as was done in
Heidorn, and should disaffirm the precedential value of that case.
V. Other Vested Rights Arguments
A. Vested Right in Continuation of Present Zoning
In several Pennsylvania cases a landowner or land purchaser
has attempted to claim that he has a vested right to the continuation
of the present zoning classification. 60 The basis of this claim is that
the owner purchased or improved the property in reliance on the
zoning classification that existed at the time, and, therefore, the mu-
nicipality should be estopped from changing the classification. This
argument has never succeeded in Pennsylvania,' 6 ' and only a very
few cases in other jurisdictions have found a vested right in these
circumstances. 1
62
Although not explicitly stated in any Pennsylvania case, the rea-
son for not finding a vested right in the continuation of a zoning
classification is that zoning must be flexible enough to cope with
changing circumstances.163 If a property owner did have this vested
right, the municipality's ability to alter the zoning to meet changing
conditions would be greatly hampered."6 This conflict suggests that
157. See Heeter, supra note 17, at 75-77.
158. See note 143 and accompanying text supra.
159. See notes 143-44 and accompanying text supra.
160. Key Realty Co. Zoning Case, 408 Pa. 98, 182 A.2d 187 (1962); Schmidt v. Philadel-
phia Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 382 Pa. 521, 114 A.2d 902 (1955); Gratton v. Conte, 364 Pa.
578, 73 A.2d 381 (1950); Hollearn v. Silverman, 338 Pa. 346, 12 A.2d 292 (1940); Kelly v.
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 2 Pa. Commw. Ct. 136, 276 A.2d 569 (1971); V.f Peterson v. Zoning
Bd. of Adjustment, 412 Pa. 582, 195 A.2d 523 (1963) (purchaser was assured proposed use was
permitted, but the permit was denied after purchase; relied on a semantic discussion of
whether cement and concrete are different in zoning context rather than examine vested rights
concepts).
161. See also Appeal of Boyle, 179 Pa. Super. Ct. 318, 116 A.2d 860 (1955) (appellant
argued that he had a vested right in being in the only commercially zoned area in the munici-
pality when the municipality attempted to rezone additional land as commercial; court found
no vested right).
162. See, e.g. Hollywood Beach Hotel Co. v. City of Hollywood, 329 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1976).
See also 13 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 373 (1977) (how to prove a case for a vested right in
an existing zoning ordinance).
163. Missouri Realty, Inc. v. Ramer, 216 Md. 442, 140.A.2d 655 (1958).
164. Limits exist, however, to the flexibility of a zoning ordinance. So-called "floating
a balancing test might be developed, weighing the reliance of and
notice to the landowner on the one side against the need to amend
the zoning ordinance or zoning map on the other side.
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B. Statutory Vested Rights." Approved Subdivision Plans
A vested right may be created by statute. In Pennsylvania, Sec-
tion 508(4) of the Municipalities Planning Code' 66 confers a vested
right on property owners who have a previously approved subdivi-
sion plan in which the lots are made too small to conform to the
regulations of a newly enacted zoning ordinance or amendment.
67
This rule creates a right to the use in accordance with the ordinances
in effect at the time the plans were properly submitted. This vested
right lasts for three years, no matter how many changes the munici-
pality makes to its ordinances during that time. 168
Legislative creating of a vested right is a compromise between
zones," which are not mapped initially but are located only when applied for by a landowner,
have not been looked upon favorably by the judiciary because they amount to rezoning with-
out notice. See, e.g., Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960) (lead-
ing Pennsylvania case on floating zones). Despite this limitation, the municipality must retain
the ability to amend the ordinance by changing zoning classifications or adding or deleting
classifications to cope with changing conditions.
165. The supreme court in Eves set out an incipient balancing test.
While it is undoubtedly true that a property owner has no vested interest in an ex-
isting zoning map and, accordingly, is always subject to the possibility of a rezoning
without notice, the zoning ordinance and its accompanying zoning maps should nev-
ertheless at any given time reflect the current planned use of the community's land so
as to afford as much notice as possible.
Id at 218, 164 A.2d at 11.
166. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(4) (Purdon 1972).
167. (4) From the time an application for approval of a plat, whether preliminary or
final, is duly filed as provided in the subdivision and land development ordinance,
and while such application is pending approval or disapproval, no change or amend-
ment of the zoning, subdivision or other governing ordinance or plan shall affect the
decision on such application adversely to the applicant and the applicant shall be
entitled to a decision in accordance with the provisions of the governing ordinances
or plans as they stood at the time the application was duly filed. In addition, when a
preliminary application has been duly approved, the applicant shall be entitled to
final approval in accordance with the terms of the approved preliminary application
as hereinafter provided. However, if an application is properly and finally denied,
any subsequent application shall be subject to the intervening change in governing
regulations. When an application for approval of a plat, whether preliminary or
final, has been approved or approved subject to conditions acceptable to the appli-
cant, no subsequent change or amendment in the zoning, subdivision or other gov-
erning ordinance or plan shall be applied to affect adversely the right of the applicant
to commence and to complete any aspect of the approved development in accordance
with the terms of such approval within three years from such approval. Where final
approval is preceded by preliminary approval, the three-year period shall be counted
from the date of the preliminary approval. In the case of any doubt as to the terms of
a preliminary approval, the terms shall be construed in the light of the provisions of
the governing ordinances or plans as they stood at the time when the application for
such approval was duly filed.
id
168. The judicially created rule that preceded the enactment of the Municipalities Plan-
ning Code was the opposite: an approved subdivision plan did not create a vested right to
develop or sell lots that later became nonconforming because of the adoption of a zoning
ordinance or amendment. York Twp. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Brown, 407 Pa. 649, 182
A.2d 706 (1962). The reasoning was that "in the abstract it is highly desirable in the zoning
process that preexisting land subdivisions should conform to later zoning laws. Otherwise,
the position of finding no vested right in the subdivider, which forces
him to resubdivide, 69 and granting him a permanent vested right,
which fills the municipality with nonconforming lots. This solution
is a reasonable attempt to balance competing interests. If the subdi-
vider has miscalculated his market and failed to sell all of the non-
conforming lots within three years, he must resubdivide. The
municipality will then have nonconforming lots only in separate
ownership, and most of the lots will have dwellings on them.
The post code cases have uniformly applied the provisions of
Section 508(4).170 Because of the first test in the statute requiring
that a decision on the subdivision plan must be made in accordance
with the ordinances existing at the date of its proper submission for
approval,17  the court has held that the pending ordinance rule
172
does not apply in the case of a subdivision plan approval. 73  The
three-year rule, 174 the second statutory requirement, has also been
upheld by the commonwealth court. 
75
The statutory provision and the cases applying it have shown
that it is possible to establish a workable vested rights rule with legis-
lation. The legislature discerned that a problem existed and attacked
it directly, 176 and the courts have had no problems in interpreting the
resulting legislation and applying it consistently. This is a good indi-
cation that a legislative enactment of a general vested rights rule will
subdivisions in their infancy could perpetuate for years the problems zoning was designed to
eliminate." Id at 652, 182 A.2d at 707.
169. In addition to what he might lose by virtue of having fewer lots to sell, the subdivider
sustains injury because new plans must be prepared. Since the lots will be larger, he may be
able to charge a higher price for them, but market conditions will be the main determinant.
He may be unable to demand an increment sufficient to recoup the loss from having fewer lots
to sell.
170. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 10508(4) (Purdon 1972). In Clover Hill Farms, Inc. v.
Board of Supervisors, 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 239, 289 A.2d 778 (1972), the rule was not applied
since the court found that the subdivision plan had been approved before the effective date of
§ 508(4) and also because more than three years had elapsed since approval. See also Friend-
ship Bldrs., Inc. v. West Brandywine Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 1 Pa. Commw. Ct. 25, 271
A.2d 511 (1970).
171. See note 167 and accompanying text supra.
172. See notes 33-53 and accompanying text supra.
173. Monumental Properties, Inc. v. Board of Comm'rs., 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 105, 311
A.2d 725 (1973). Accord, Vogel v. Hopewell Twp., 27 Pa. Commw. Ct. 118, 365 A.2d 706
(1976); Devonshire Realty Corp. v. Township of Maxatawney, 22 Pa. Commw. Ct. 555, 349
A.2d 802 (1976). The statute, in effect, creates its own pending ordinance rule.
174. See note 167 and accompanying text supra.
175. Gable v. Springfield Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 18 Pa. Commw. Ct. 381, 335 A.2d
886 (1975). This rule has not been applied, however, in the case of a developer who purchased
a partially developed subdivision with the knowledge that some of the lots did not conform to
the present zoning, whether or not they conformed at the time when the plan was first ap-
proved. Ephross v. Solebury Twp. Zoning Hearing Bd., 25 Pa. Commw. Ct. 140, 359 A.2d 182
(1976). See also Central Penn Nat. Bank v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 33 Bucks 38 (Pa. C.P. 1978),
for application of rule.
176. Perhaps one reason why legislation has been enacted in this area is because the devel-
opers in Pennsylvania have a fairly strong lobby. Other types of vested rights problems previ-
ously referred to almost invariably affect only the single owner of a particular piece of property
rather than a developer who owns many tracts.
work and will be able to diminish the confusion that has permeated
the Pennsylvania decisions until recent years.
C Judicially Created Vested Rights
When a landowner appeals to the court a decision denying him
a permit, and the court orders that the permit be issued, the land-
owner may then acquire a vested right. The municipality cannot
continue to refuse to issue the permit or revoke it on other grounds if
the permittee continues to conform to all other applicable ordi-
nances.177 This is particularly true when the municipality goes to
great lengths to frustrate the applicant 78 for some reason such as
citizen opposition. 179 Thus, any act of the municipality that attempts
thereafter to interfere with a judicially ordered permit is in bad
faith '8 and does not affect the permittee's rights acquired by the is-
suance of the permit. This is a sensible rule since a property owner
who has just won protracted litigation at great expense certainly
would not seek a judicial remedy if the municipality could still frus-
trate him after he has fully litigated the matter and won.
VI. Conclusion
The law of vested rights and zoning in Pennsylvania is, in many
ways, unique among the fifty states.' 8' Pennsylvania is the only state
that has developed a pending ordinance rule that can be applied rea-
sonably consistently, although it is not yet clear whether reliance
upon the permit is necessary or when it occurs. 82 Development of
this rule is a great improvement over the rules that preceded it, but a
deficiency remains. 83 An excessive number of inconsistent prior
cases also remains as precedent to allow circumvention of the rule.
The legislature could effect the optimal solution by enacting a statu-
177. Raum v. Board of Supervisors, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 9, 370 A.2d 777 (1977); Borough
of Brookhaven v. Reece, 19 Pa. Commw. Ct. 16, 339 A.2d 621 (1975) (prior mandamus action;
validity of permit agreed to by borough); Council of Borough of Monroeville v. Al Manzo
Const. Co., 5 Pa. Commw. Ct. 97, 289 A.2d 496 (1972) (prior stipulation of validity of permit
in settling litigation was res judicata to subsequent attempt to revoke and relitigate validity of
permit).
178. Raum v. Board of Supervisors, 29 Pa. Commw. Ct. 9, 370 A.2d 777 (1970).
179. "Attempts to legislatively amend approved zoning for the purpose of frustrating de-
velopment can be viewed as nothing more than contempt of our Order [in a previous case]."
Id at 50, 370 A.2d at 799.
180. See notes 91-98 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of municipal bad faith
in other contexts.
181. Only four states-New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and California--have had
enough vested rights cases to be able to discern a trend or rule within the cases of that state
alone. Each follows a different rule. See note 65 supra. None of these States' rules have
developed to the point of fixing a date when a right vests.
182. Washington and South Carolina use similar rules. See note 30 supra.
183. The developer may be able passively to hold the permit and acquire a vested right to
construct a nonconforming use far in the future. See notes 102-103 and accompanying text
supra.
tory vested rights rule. Since the General Assembly has already en-
acted a vested rights rule applying to subdivision development,
84
there is precedent for creation of a statutory general vested rights
rule. If the legislature does not act, the courts must continue to re-
fine the pending ordinance rule to eliminate the remaining difficul-
ties. Pennsylvania courts have been able to deal successfully with
the easier vested rights situations that do not involve a valid permit.
Any legislative or judicial attempt to deal with the subject must bal-
ance the interests of the landowner in using his property as he
wishes, against the interest of the municipality in promoting the gen-
eral health, safety, and welfare of its residents.
Developing a consistent, easily applicable set of vested rights
rules has not been easy in any jurisdiction. 185 After years of confu-
sion, Pennsylvania's courts have developed a method of dealing with
vested rights and zoning that has the potential both for effective op-
eration and for consistent application. All that is required is legisla-
tive or judicial action to remove the remaining area of doubt in the
rule-the clarification of whether substantial reliance upon the per-
mit is necessary to make the pending ordinance rule operate. If such
reliance is necessary, its timing must be clarified. If it is not, the
deficiency that may enable a landowner to sit on a validly issued
permit for a great length of time must be eliminated.
DAVID C. KEITER
184. See notes 100-110 and accompanying text supra.
185. See MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 2-309 (Official Text 1975) for an example
of this difficulty. Comment one to § 2-309 evidences disagreement over whether a limit should
be placed on the length of time during which an ordinance can remain pending. The reporters
did not include the time limit, fearing that it might cause more problems than it solved. The
text of§ 2-309 is a compromise in other respects. It adopts an "in the interest ofjustice" test to
finding a vested right. This resembles the Illinois balancing test but is weak in that it gives no
definite guidelines. It will not end the confusion in vested rights law.
